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CORNELL H R REVIEW 
THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IN PENSION PLANS 
Beverly I. Moron 
I. Introduction 
Picture the Human Resources Director of a Fortune 500 company explaining how 
his company prides itself on its global positioning—which includes its leadership in 
creating a diverse national and international workforce. In order to keep its varied 
workforce happy and productive, the company voluntarily accommodates various types 
of religious headgear, jewelry, and facial hair. In addition, the company's large number 
of employees allows for a fair amount of scheduling flexibility with non-Christian 
employees working during Christian holidays while Christian employees cover non-
Christian holidays. 
Now imagine the Human Resources Director's surprise when his company's 
Muslim employees request a Sharia-compliant investment option within the employer-
sponsored pension plan. As a Roman Catholic, the Human Resources Director is vaguely 
aware of his Church's condemnation of usury and its instructions to invest with an eye 
toward the sacredness of human life and the alleviation of poverty. However, he is 
unaware of the Islamic law of finance. It now occurs to the Human Resources Director 
and his company's Board of Directors that even non-Muslim employees might have 
religious and ethical attitudes towards their pension fund investments. Must the company 
do anything in the face of an employee request for religious accommodation in the 
company's private pension plan investment options? 
This article investigates the Supreme Court's religious accommodation in the 
workplace jurisprudence concerning and finds that employers are not presently obligated 
to offer religiously compliant investment options to their employees although a 
competing line of Supreme Court decisions in the tax area argues for the right of religious 
accommodation in pension investing. 
II. The United States private pension system 
The federal government regulates both mandatory and voluntary retirement 
programs. The two largest mandatory retirement programs are Social Security and 
Medicare. The most popular voluntary retirement programs are pension plans governed 
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA's rules appear in 
both the Labor Law and the Internal Revenue Code. ERISA is completely voluntary. 
Employers are not required to set up ERISA qualified retirement plans and employees are 
not required to participate. Yet tens of thousands of employers maintain ERISA 
governed retirement plans that serve millions of private sector workers and contain 
trillions of dollars in assets. 
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ERISA's popularity rests on its protective regulations and generous tax benefits. 
The Labor side of ERISA protects workers' expectations in their retirement rights. The 
Tax side of ERISA gives employers immediate tax deductions and employees decades of 
tax deferral. ERISA gives employers control over pension plan sponsorship and design. 
Although employers are free to design any plan or no plan, ERISA's tax benefits only 
apply to "Qualified Plans." 
This Article discusses §401(k) plans and §403(b) plans. Section 401(k) plans and 
§403(b) plans are pension plans that allow workers to contribute before tax dollars 
toward retirement and to direct where those dollars are invested within an employer-
limited universe of options. The plans are named after the sections that create them in the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
ERISA directly addresses discrimination in employee benefits and pensions based 
on age and income. ERISA's rules do not directly address other types of discrimination 
covered by Title VII such as sex, color, race, or national origin. Nevertheless, the rules 
for qualifying a pension plan under ERISA are meant to make pensions widely available. 
Further, as discussed below, the Supreme Court has read Title VII's non-discrimination 
protections into ERISA. 
III. Islamic law and the prohibition against interest 
Americans are often confused about Islamic observances and practices. Nowhere 
is this confusion more evident than in regard to Islamic law. Unlike state-centered law, 
Islamic law is religious law. As religious law, Islamic law controls Muslims' lives and 
actions wherever they live and whatever their secular obligations. In this sense, Islamic 
law is like Jewish law and Canon law—it travels with the believer across national and 
legal boundaries. 
Theologically, Islamic law differs from Canon Law and Jewish law in that the 
Muslim tradition accepts the Quran as the direct word of God transcribed by the Prophet 
Mohammed without error. Yet, the three Abrahamic traditions share many common 
aspects. Although the general view in the West is that neither Christianity nor Judaism 
restricts it members' investment options, Muslims are not alone in facing religious 
restrictions on their economic activities. Because Canon Law still prohibits usury, 
Roman Catholics remain subject to restrictions on charging excessive interest. 
Additionally, Roman Catholic Bishops, including the current Pope Benedict XVI, direct 
Catholics to consider such issues as abortion, contraception, militarism, usury, and social 
justice when investing. Within Judaism, the Hebrew Bible also contains passages that 
prohibit usury, particularly when interest is charged to relatives or others to whom 
protection and charity is owed. 
Like Canon law and Jewish law, Islamic law has specific rules regarding financial 
transactions. However, unlike many 21st Century Western Christians and Jews, Western 
Muslims are more likely to follow their religion's financial teachings and accordingly 
refrain from non-compliant investment options. 
Although far from unique in the Abrahamic traditions, the Islamic prohibition 
against usury has attracted a great deal of attention and criticism from Western analysts. 
For years the Western critique was that the Islamic law of finance held Muslim countries 
and their economies hostage to pre-modern business practices. Recently, as the Western 
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world has faced economic collapse, the Islamic law of finance appears increasingly 
sound. 
For example, Islamic financial ethics oppose selling financial instruments 
designed to fail. In contrast to Western economic traditions, which encourage arm's 
length relationships between lender and borrower, Islamic finance prefers economic 
partnerships where financiers maintain an economic stake in the outcome of the business 
activities their money supports. Had Goldman Sachs operated in a system that obligated 
equity interests in financial creations, Goldman's partners would have lost the incentive 
to develop and promote investments meant to fail. 
IV. Supreme Court jurisprudence on religious accommodation in the workplace 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Title VII) applies to most employers— 
public and private. Title VII's basic purpose is to prohibit discrimination in hiring and 
employment on the basis of race, national origin, color, religion, and sex. Under Title 
VII, religion includes observance and practice, as well as belief. Thus, Title VII monitors 
more than hiring and promotion. The statute also requires employers to reasonably 
accommodate religious observance and practice. The Supreme Court has read Title VII 
into employee benefit and pension plans through such decisions as Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, Arizona Governing Commission v. Morris, 
and Gilbert v. General Electric. 
Originally, Title VII only addressed religious discrimination in the workplace. 
The statute did not go on to require religious accommodation. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) introduced the idea of religious accommodation in its 
1967 rules directing employers "...to make reasonable accommodations to the religious 
needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be 
made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 
In support of the EEOC regulations, Congress amended Title VII in order to 
include religious accommodation within the statute's anti-discrimination protections. 
Nevertheless, in TWA v. Hardison and Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook the 
Supreme Court held that employers have no obligation to accommodate religious practice 
if the accommodation causes more than a de minimus business hardship and that, should 
the employer decide to accommodate, the employer's chosen method of accommodation 
will always override any employee preferences. 
There are sharp contrasts between the statute, the Supreme Court decisions, and 
the EEOC rules on the question of what an employer owes an employee in the way of 
religious accommodation in the workplace. As a result, the Court's decisions give the 
employer maximum flexibility based on its taste for litigation. 
Employers who wish to avoid litigation and be in complete compliance with the 
EEOC will follow the EEOC rules and review every reasonable alternative before 
determining that a religious accommodation presents an undue business hardship. 
Further, as between various reasonable alternatives, the employer will select the 
alternative that most accommodates the employee. These employers will readily adopt 
religiously compliant investments into their Qualified Plan options. On the other hand, 
employers who are willing to take on the EEOC if challenged can rely on the Supreme 
Court to avoid any religious accommodation obligation. 
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But even the most risk taking employer should consider that the Court has never 
faced a religious accommodation request made against the background of a substantial 
tax benefit. Under the Court's classic religious accommodation in the workplace 
jurisprudence, when Congress asks for religious accommodation from the employer but 
gives nothing in return the Court rejects the employer's obligation to accommodate 
unless the accommodation is cost-free. The following sections take up the question: 
what is Congress' power to demand employer compliance when the requested religious 
accommodation is wedded to a tax subsidy as is the case with pension plans? 
V. The Supreme Court's tax jurisprudence and how it differs from 
its Title VII analysis 
More than seventy years ago, Stanley Surry, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. 
Treasury for Tax Policy, introduced the concept of a tax expenditure budget. Tax 
expenditures are the cost to the government in lost revenues that arise from tax 
deductions, exclusions, and credits. Surry identified tax expenditures as hidden 
government subsidies. 
Surry believed that the public's lack of concern over tax expenditures reflected 
the Internal Revenue Code's opacity. In order to make taxpayers aware of tax 
expenditures to the same extent as direct government subsidies, Surry convinced 
Congress to produce an annual tax expenditure budget. The tax expenditure budget 
shows the cost in revenue of significant tax benefits. For example, the charitable 
contribution deduction ranks as the sixth most costly tax benefit at an annual cost of 
$46.8 billion. In contrast, pension contributions rank as the second most costly tax 
benefit at an annual cost of $117.7 billion. 
In contrast to the Supreme Court's Title VII decisions, the Court's federal subsidy 
decisions paint a different picture of Congressional power. In these federal subsidy 
decisions, the Court allows Congress to force relinquishment of constitutional rights in 
exchange for federal benefits. 
In South Dakota v. Dole, Congress withheld five percent of federal highway funds 
from South Dakota because the State permitted 19 year olds to drink alcohol. The 
Supreme Court held that Congress was not unduly coercive when it withheld the federal 
funds even though the penalty was triggered when South Dakota exercised its 
constitutional right to regulate the public welfare within its borders. South Dakota v. 
Dole is one of several Supreme Court decisions that acknowledge Congress' right to 
demand forbearance of constitutional rights in exchange for receipt of government 
subsidy. 
Another example of the Congress' right to demand the relinquishment of a 
constitutional right in exchange for a government subsidy was displayed in the debate 
over Bob Jones University's tax exempt status. Bob Jones University was dedicated to 
teaching fundamentalist Christian beliefs including prohibitions against interracial dating 
and marriage. Although not affiliated with any religious denomination, Bob Jones 
University was tax exempt as both an educational and a religious organization. To 
effectuate its religious views, Bob Jones University completely excluded "Negroes" from 
its student body until 1971. From 1971 to May 1975 the University continued to refuse 
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application from "unmarried Negroes" but did accept applications from "Negroes married 
within their race." 
Bob Jones University was inspired to open its admission to married Negroes in 
1971 because of Revenue Ruling 71-447. Based on the "national policy to discourage 
racial discrimination in education," Revenue Ruling 71-447 declared that "...a private 
school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' 
within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501 (c)(3) of the Code." 
In other words, a school that practiced race discrimination could not receive the tax 
benefits associated with charitable organizations such as tax exempt income and 
deductible charitable contributions. 
Bob Jones University challenged the government's denial of its tax exempt status 
declaring that Revenue Ruling 71-447 burdened its sincerely held religious belief. 
Further, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent in support of continuing the 
University's tax exemption, Revenue Ruling 71-447 imposed a greater restriction on the 
taxpayer than Congress itself required in IRC section 501 (c)(3). The University met the 
statutory criteria for both a religious and an educational organization. Nevertheless, 
although the statute did not directly prohibit race discrimination, the Court agreed with 
the Treasury that even religious schools are not exempt charities when they practice race 
discrimination. 
While the Supreme Court refused mandatory religious accommodation under 
Title VII in Hardison and Ansonia Board of Education, the same Court had no qualms 
about burdening the University's Free Exercise of Religion in exchange for a government 
tax subsidy in Bob Jones University. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, which 
appears alongside Bob Jones University in the Supreme Court Reports, presents the same 
problem in a secular context: May Congress premise a tax exemption on the taxpayer 
relinquishing the right to Petition Government? Justice Rehnquist, who advocated in 
favor of Bob Jones University retaining its tax exemption, delivered the Court's opinion 
in Taxation with Representation upholding the IRC section 501(c)(3) limits on political 
speech: 
Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of 
subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax 
exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the 
organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on 
its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash 
grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's 
contributions. The system Congress has enacted provides 
this kind of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations 
generally, and an additional subsidy to those charitable 
organizations that do not engage in substantial lobbying. In 
short, Congress chose not to subsidize other activities that 
nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public 
welfare. 
VI. Contrasting the Sabbatarian cases with pension plans 
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The two Supreme Court decisions that look at religious accommodation under 
Title VII concern private employers asked to rearrange employee work schedules to 
accommodate Sabbatarians. In both cases the employer faced a potential penalty for 
failure to provide religious accommodation but no benefit for compliance with the 
statute's requirements. In response to Congress' demands on the employer without a 
corresponding benefit, the Court treated the Title VII accommodation obligation as an 
Establishment of religion and as a burden on the employer's and non-believer employees' 
Free Exercise rights. Accordingly, the Court diminished Congress' religious 
accommodation rule under Title VII to the point that no motivated employer need ever 
accommodate an employee's religious practice. 
Not all religious accommodations occur in the same context. As opposed to 
religious accommodation under Title VII, the Court generally gives Congress great 
deference when the legislature bestows tax benefits in exchange for taxpayers eschewing 
even constitutionally protected activities. Private pension plans are founded on the 
tremendous tax benefits bestowed on retirement accounts by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA). These benefits invoke the deference to Congress 
exhibited in the Court's tax decisions specifically, and its government subsidy decisions 
generally, rather than the hostility to forced religious accommodation reflected in the 
Court's Title VII decisions. 
Conclusion 
This article asks whether employees whose religious beliefs prevent investment in 
their employers' private pension plans have a right to religious accommodation. This is a 
real issue for a growing part of the population whose spiritual lives are governed by rules 
that prohibit the giving or taking of interest as well as those whose Church requires them 
to consider other religious concerns in their investments. As one might expect, the 
investments available through most American pension plans involve some aspect of 
interest, thereby making those investments unsuitable retirement vehicles for devout 
Muslims. Many pension plans also have no social justice investment options making 
them equally inappropriate for devout Roman Catholics. Consequently, in order to 
secure their retirement income, religious employees are faced with either violating their 
religious beliefs, waiting for the American investment market to meet their religious 
needs, relying on their employer's goodwill, or religious accommodation through court or 
statute. 
Religious accommodation in the workplace is governed by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act (Title VII). The statute is directive and punitive. There are potential 
money damages if an employer does not comply with Title VII's religious 
accommodation requirement but no benefit (monetary or otherwise) in exchange for 
compliance. 
Using retirement savings as a model, this Article challenges the notion that a 
motivated employer can always avoid religious accommodation. Instead the Article 
argues that when the government confers tax benefits, as it does to private pensions, then 
Title VII's religious accommodation provisions—as well as its prohibitions against other 
types of discrimination—are greatly enhanced because Congress may impose obligations 
in return for tax benefits without violating constitutional prohibitions. The intersection of 
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tax policy and religious accommodation allows for greater consideration of Supreme 
Court decisions that reflect a more deferential attitude towards Congress and the penchant 
towards accommodation than the Court generally demonstrates under Title VII. 
Thus, the Human Resources Director we encountered at the beginning of this 
article should consider that religious accommodation in pension investing is an even 
greater right than the headgear and jewelry that his company allows. Congress provides 
his company with nothing in exchange for its acceptance of a wide variety of religious 
practices. But Congress gives his company millions of dollars in tax benefits as part of 
encouraging the maintenance of its private pension. Just as Congress can force South 
Dakota to set a higher drinking age or Bob Jones University to admit students of all races 
in exchange for a government subsidy, Congress can demand religious accommodation of 
the company's employees as part of its private pension plan. N 
Beverly I. Moran is a professor of Law and Sociology at the Vanderbilt University School 
of Law in Nashville, Tennessee. 
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